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PEER PRESSURE: CORRELATIONS
BETWEEN MEMBERSHIP IN REGIONAL
AND REGIONAL ECONOMIC
ORGANIZATIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF
WTO DISPUTE RESOLUTION CLAIMS
Alexandra R. Harrington, Esq.
I. INTRODUCTION
Peer pressure is a well-known phenomenon, believed responsible
for everything from teenage experimentation and angst to the cliff-
diving habits of lemmings. But peer pressure is less commonly thought
of as a motivation for a state to act - or fail to act - in the international
trade arena. The goal of this article is to explore the relationship
between a state's membership in a variety of regional and regional
economic organizations and its history of bringing complaints against
fellow members of these organizations at the World Trade Organization
(WTO) dispute settlement body, to determine whether membership in
these organizations creates any sense of peer pressure regarding WTO
complaints.
To complete this exploration, Part II of this article provides
background on the WTO's dispute settlement body and the procedure it
uses to handle complaints brought before it by member states. Part III
provides legal and economic background on the regional and regional
economic organizations whose members have complained against other
members to the WTO's dispute settlement body. Part IV analyzes the
actions of members of the selected regional and regional economic
organizations once at the WTO's dispute settlement body. Part V then
analyzes the information in Parts II - IV and makes findings regarding
the importance of legal structures and a sense of regional communality
in the decision of whether to bring a WTO complaint against a fellow
member of a regional or regional economic organization. Finally, Part
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VII concludes that peer pressure in the context of regional and regional
economic organizations depends more on the structure of the
organization and the communal understandings of its members than on
the overt appeal of giving into a state's peers.
11. WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT BODY
A system of organized trade rules and principles for international
trade has existed in some form for nearly a century. Beginning as a set
of agreements between a limited number of economically powerful
states, the concept of a globalized trading scheme became popular
among states of all sizes in the aftermath of World War 11 and the
beginning of the decolonization process.2 Between 1947 and 1994, the
1947 GATT agreement contained the framework for this globalized
system agreement. 3 In 1994, however, the extant system created under
the 1947 GATT was overhauled in favor of a new GATT agreement,
which included the creation of the WTO.4
Among the inventions of the 1994 GATT agreement was the
WTO dispute settlement system. 5 Under this system, a WTO member
has potential recourse for alleged violations of GATT or subsequently
enacted WTO trade agreements by bringing a formal complaint before
the WTO dispute settlement body.6 This body has several levels of
juridical competence. 7 Procedurally, after a complaint is filed with the
WTO dispute settlement body, a member state "may request the
establishment of a Panel." 8 The Panel, a non-partisan group of experts,
hears the complaint and makes findings of law and fact regarding the
I See PAUL A. STEPHAN, JULIE A. ROIN, DON WALLANCE JR.,
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS: LAW AND POLIcY 76 (Lexisnexis
2004) (1993).
2 id.
3 See THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TRADE AND TARIFFS (GATT
1947), WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, available at http://www.wto.org/english/
docs_ e/legale/gatt47 01_e.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2008).
4 See GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TRADE AND TARIFFS 1994, URUGUAY
ROUND, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, available at http://www.wto.org/
english/docs e/legal e/06-gatt e.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2008).
5 See UNDERSTANDING ON RULES AND PROCEDURES GOVERNING THE
SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES, URUGUAY ROUND, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION,
available at http://www.wto.org/english/docse/legal_e/28-dsue.htm (last
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issues raised in the complaint and any counter-complaints raised by the
respondent state. 9 A set timeframe exists in which the Panel must make
its findings, although this period may be extended where facts or legal
issues require an extension. 10 Once the Panel issues its decision -
which can be in favor of either party or favorable to each party on some
level - both parties may take an appeal of the Panel's decision to the
Appellate Body." Even after the Appellate Body issues a decision, the
parties will typically enter into WTO-overseen negotiations regarding
the implementation of the measures required in the decision of the
Appellate Body; the same procedure typically occurs with regard to a
Panel decision. 12
III. LEGAL FRAMEWORKS OF APPLICABLE REGIONAL AND
REGIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATIONS
There are a plethora of regional and regional economic
organizations in existence at present. For the purposes of this article,
however, the following regional economic organizations and regional
organizations with economic components will be analyzed because
members of these organizations have brought claims against other
members before the WTO. Specifically, these organizations are: the
Asian Development Bank (ADB), Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation
(APEC), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the
Central American Common Market (CACM), the Central American
Bank for Economic Integration (BCIE), the European Investment Bank
(EIB), the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), the Latin
American Integration Association (LAIA), Southern Cone Common
Market (MERCOSUR), the Organization of American States (OAS),
and the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC).
The European Union has specifically been excluded from the
parameters of this study because it operates as a governmental body
rather than a strictly regional organization and thus offers its members a




" See UNDERSTANDING ON RULES AND PROCEDURES GOVERNING THE
SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES, URUGUAY ROUND, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION,
available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legale/28-dsu e.htm (last
visited Apr. 20, 2008).
12 Id.
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A. ADB
The ADB was founded in 1966 with the goal of functioning as a
regional bank that would finance projects for its member states and
encourage economic growth and stability throughout the economies of
its member states.13 The ADB is structured in a similar manner to a
corporation. Its ADB members and non-regional members subscribe to
a certain amount of bank shares, the cost of which is used as the central
method of funding bank operations.14  Under the terms of the
Agreement Establishing the ADB, funding for approved projects may
go to the government of a member state directly or to a private entity
operating within the member's territory and seeking to perform a
certain project.1 5  Specific criteria exist for project eligibility and
approval, making it difficult for any country or project to suffer a
rejection as the result of suits brought before the WTO, were such
retaliation contemplated. 16 The terms and conditions of loans and
financing arrangements undertaken by the ADB are set forth in this
Agreement, again making retaliation for actions taken at the WTO in
the form of recalling or otherwise altering a debt virtually impossible.17
The Agreement Establishing the ADB provides that each
member has a representative on the ADB Board of Governors' 8 and
specifically articulates the powers of the Board of Governors1 9 The
possibility for retaliation is limited further due to equality of
membership on the governing body of the ADB. Each member has
equal voting power on the ADB Board of Directors. Suspension of a
member state may only occur in a defined set of limited circumstances,
which do not involve other activities at the WTO level. 21 The Board of
Directors hears and decides any questions of the Agreement
Establishing the ADB's interpretation or application where this issue
22arises between the Bank and a member state. In the event that a
withdrawn member state and the Bank disagree on issues related to the
13 See ABOUT ADB, ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, available at http://ww
w.adb.org/About/default.asp (last visited Apr. 20, 2008).
14 AGREEMENT ESTABLISHING THE ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK ch. I,
Dec. 4, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1418, 571 U.N.T.S. 123 [hereinafter ADB Agreement].
'" Id. ch. III.
16 Id.
'v Id. art. 15.
is Id. ch. VI.
19 Id.
20 Id. ch. VI.
21 Id.
22 Id. ch. X, art. 60.
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withdrawal, the issue will be submitted to a panel of three arbitrators
for resolution.23 The same procedure would be used in the event that
the ADB dissolves and there is a conflict with a member state during or
after the dissolution.24 There are, however, no provisions regarding
settling disagreements between member states themselves.
The members of the ADB are: Afghanistan, Armenia, Australia,
Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia,
China, Cook Islands, Fiji, Georgia, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia,
Japan, Kazakhstan, Kiribati, the Republic of Korea, the Kyrgyz
Republic, Laos, Malaysia, the Maldives, the Marshall Islands, the
Federated States of Micronesia, Mongolia, Myanmar (Burma), Nauru,
Nepal, New Zealand, Pakistan, Palau, Papua New Guinea, the
Philippines, Samoa, Singapore, the Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka,
Taiwan,26 Tajikistan, Thailand, Timor-Leste,27 Tonga, Turkmenistan,
Tuvalu, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu and Vietnam. 28 Of these members,
Armenia, Australia, Bangladesh, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, China,
Fiji, Georgia, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Japan, the Republic of
Korea, the Kyrgyz Republic, Malaysia, the Maldives, Mongolia,
Myanmar, Nepal, New Zealand, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, the
Philippines, Singapore, the Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Taiwan,
Thailand, Tonga and Vietnam are also WTO members.29 Eight ADB
members- Azerbaijan, Bhutan, Kazakhstan, Laos, Samoa, Tajikistan,
Uzbekistan and Vanuatu are WTO observer governments, meaning that
they will either become full-fledged members of the WTO within a set
period of time or become disassociated with the WTO entirely.
30
Interestingly, Vietnam is one of the WTO's newest members, having
become a member in 2007.31 There are also sixteen non-regional
members of the ADB: Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland,
23 Id. art. 61.
24 id.
25 id.
26 Although frequently referred to as Chinese Taipei, the author will use
the designation of Taiwan because of its familiarity to American readers.
27 Timor-Leste is frequently referred to as East Timor.
28 See MEMBERSHIP, ABOUT ADB, ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK,
available at http://www.adb.org/About/membership.asp (last visited Apr. 20,
2008).
29 See MEMBERS AND OBSERVERS, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION,
available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/whatis e/tif e/org6_e.htm
(last visited Apr. 20, 2008).
30 Id.
31 Id.
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France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Norway,
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom
and the United States. 32 All of these non-regional members are WTO
members.
B. APEC
APEC was founded in 1993 with the goal of creating a free trade
zone in the Asian-Pacific region by the year 2010. 34 The scope of
APEC's policy area extends beyond that of the WTO, seeking to
incorporate regional businesses and technological advances in its
overall economic liberalization scheme. 35 APEC is funded entirely
through its members, although it has a very limited range of projects for
which it will provide funding directly. 36 Once a member state makes a
donation to APEC for any purpose, the member state is removed from
control over the use of that money, thus significantly reducing the
ability of an APEC member state to retaliate against a member state
that seeks to bring a dispute proceeding against it before the WTO
dispute settlement body.
37
APEC operates as a consensus driven entity in which all
members have parity. APEC's goal is to foster progressive trade
systems domestically and throughout the region. 38 Key leadership
positions within APEC rotate between member states, as the locations
of APEC meetings.39 Importantly, APEC does not have a dispute
settlement body or dispute resolution system in the event that a trade
dispute arises between its members.
40
32 See MEMBERSHIP, ABOUT ADB, ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK,
available at http://www.adb.org/About/membership.asp (last visited Apr. 20,
2008).
33 id.
34 See HISTORY, ABOUT APEC, APEC, available at http://www.apec.org
/apec/about apec/history.html (last visited Apr. 20, 2008).
35 See SCOPE OF WORK, ABOUT APEC, APEC, available at http://www.
apec.org/apec/about apec/scopeofwork.html (last visited Apr. 20, 2008).
36 See How APEC WORKS, APEC, available at http://www.apec.org/




40 See ABOUT APEC, APEC, available at http://www.apec.org/apec/
aboutapec/howapecoperates.html (last visited Apr. 22, 2008).
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The member states of APEC are: Australia, Brunei Darussalam,
Canada, Chile, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia,
Mexico, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Peru, the Philippines,
Russia, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand, the United States and
Venezuela. 41 All of these members are WTO members except for
Russia.42
C. ASEAN
ASEAN was originally founded in 1967 and accepted new
members through 1999.43 ASEAN is an organization which seeks to
promote trade and economic development among its members and also
seeks to promote a unified regional stance on political structures, the
environment and transportation issues, to name a few policy areas in
which ASEAN works. 44 In this sense, it is a regional organization
rather than a purely regional economic organization.
In furtherance of its trade promotion goals, ASEAN created a
member free trade agreement (AFTA) 45 and has entered into similar
free trade arrangements with neighboring non-member states.46
ASEAN has become especially involved in trade and technology
transfers with China. It is worth noting that none of the free trade and
knowledge sharing agreements in existence between ASEAN and
China allow the parties to seek outside intervention in the event of a
dispute.47 Other than its relationship with China, no other ASEAN
partnerships or agreements have such restrictions.4a  More than any
41 See MEMBER ECONOMIES, APEC, available at http://www.apec.org/
apec/aboutapec/scope of work.html (last visited Apr. 20, 2008).
42 See MEMBERS AND OBSERVERS, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION,
available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/whatise/tif e/org6_e.htm
(last visited Apr. 20, 2008).
43 See ABOUT ASEAN, ASEAN, available at http://www.aseansec.org
/64.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2008).
44 Id.
45 See TRADE, ASEAN, available at http://www.asean.org/12022.htm
(last visited Apr. 22, 2008).
46 See id.
47 See AGREEMENTS AND DECLARATIONS, ASEAN - PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC
OF CHINA, EXTERNAL RELATIONS, ASEAN, available at
http://www.aseansec.org/4979.htm (last visited Apr. 22, 2008).
48 See generally EXTERNAL RELATIONS, ASEAN, available at
http://www.aseansec.org/4918.htm (last visited Apr. 22, 2008) (stating that
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other regional organization studied in this article, ASEAN's financial
agreements and declarations are truly consensus-based and echo a sense
that ASEAN's members are in a unique and relatively similar financial
position, which is benefitted by its members acting in concert and
settling differences between themselves. 49 ASEAN's trade agreements
are virtually silent on the WTO's existence or jurisdiction. 50 At the
same time, many measures agreed to by ASEAN members could easily
be viewed as problematic under GATT and the WTO system in that
they create regional preferences and reciprocal tariff-lowering
requirements solely for ASEAN members. 51 ASEAN has enacted two
protocols on dispute settlements, each of which are essentially the same
as the WTO's dispute settlement system.52 The dispute settlement
systems created by ASEAN have broader jurisdiction than most of the
dispute settlement mechanisms created by other regional organizations
and do not specifically reference the WTO dispute settlement body.
53
The members of ASEAN are: Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia,
Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore,
other ASEAN partnerships may seek outside intervention in the event of a
dispute).
49 See, e.g., DECLARATION OF ASEAN CONCORD It (BALI CONCORD II),
ASEAN, available at http://www.aseansec.org/19096.htm (last visited Apr. 22,
2008) (depicting a consensus among members in arriving at the agreement);
AGREEMENT ON THE COMMON EFFECTIVE PREFERENTIAL TARIFF SCHEME FOR
THE ASEAN FREE TRADE AREA, ASEAN, available at http://www.Aseansec.
org/12475.htm (last visited Apr. 22, 2008) (demonstrating the general
consensus among members); FRAMEWORK AGREEMENTS ON ENHANCING
ASEAN ECONOMIC COOPERATION (1992), ASEAN, available at http://www.
aseansec.org/12474.htm (last visited Apr. 22, 2008) (demonstrating the general
consensus among members); ASEAN FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT ON THE
FACILITATION OF GOODS IN TRANSIT, ASEAN, available at http://www.
aseansec.org/2325.htm (last visited Apr. 22, 2008) (demonstrating the general
consensus among members); PROTOCOL ON THE SPECIAL ARRANGEMENT FOR
SENSITIVE AND HIGHLY SENSITIVE PRODUCTS (1999), ASEAN, available at
http://www.aseansec.org/2118.htm (last visited Apr. 22, 2008) (demonstrating
the general consensus among members).
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 See PROTOCOL ON DISPUTE SETTLEMENT MECHANISM (1996),
ASEAN, available at http://www.aseansec.org/7813.htm (last visited Apr. 22,
2008); ASEAN PROTOCOL ON ENHANCED DISPUTE SETTLEMENT MECHANISM
(2006), ASEAN, available at http://www.aseansec.org/16755.htm (last visited
Apr. 22, 2008).
53 Id.
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Thailand and Vietnam. 54 All ASEAN members are WTO members
except for Laos, which is currently a WTO observer government.
55
D. CACM
Member states founded CACM in 1958 by enacting the Central
American Free Trade and Economic Integration Multilateral Treaty.
56
This treaty enshrined the ideals of creating a free trade area between
members and provided for economic interrelation, but did not contain
any provisions governing the resolution of disputes between member
states.57 In addition to these economic principles, CACM exists to
further an overall system of regional protection and integration that
includes security assistance. 58 In 1960, CACM enacted the General
Treaty on Central American Integration, which provided that questions
of treaty interpretation raised by member states would be settled by the
executive entity established in the 1958 treaty.59
The members of CACM are: Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador,
Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama and the Dominican Republic.60  All
members of CACM are WTO members.
6'
E. BCIE
Founded in 1960, the BCIE seeks to eradicate poverty, increase
access to and benefit from globalization, and promote economic
54 MEMBER COUNTRIES, ASEAN, available at http://www.aseansec.
org/74.htm (last visited Apr. 22, 2008).
55 MEMBERS AND OBSERVERS, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, available
at http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/whatise/tif e/org6e.htm (last visited
Apr. 22, 2008).
56 See CENTRAL AMERICAN FREE TRADE AND INTEGRATION
MULTILATERAL TREATY (1958), CACM, available at http://www.sice.oas.org
/SICA/instmt e.asp (last visited Apr. 22, 2008).
57 id.
58 id.
59 See GENERAL TREATY ON CENTRAL AMERICAN INTEGRATION, CACM,
available at http://www.sice.oas.org/SICA/instmt e.asp (last visited Apr. 22,
2008).
60 Id.
61 MEMBERS AND OBSERVERS, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, available
at http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/whatise/tif e/org6_e.htm (last visited
Apr. 22, 2008).
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integration among its members.62 It operates largely outside of the
WTO framework by encouraging regional and bilateral free trade
agreements. 63 The BCIE is heavily focused on business development
and support but eschews spotlighting member states in favor of
concentrating on the needs of particular businesses and sectors of the
regional economy.64 As with other regionally-focused banks discussed
in this article, the BCIE's member states are its shareholders, and the
proceeds of share sales are used as a key method of financing BCIE's
65projects. Member states have equal power in the governing
institutions of the BCIE, mitigating the potential for retaliatory action
in the event that a WTO dispute claim is brought against another
member state.66 The BCIE Board of Governors has jurisdiction to
decide any questions of interpretation or application of the basic BCIE
agreement provisions.6 7 The BCIE makes funding decisions subject to
specific guidelines and requirements, which further militates against
any potential for retaliation. 68 The BCIE does not have a dispute
settlement procedure or apparatus.
69
The members of the BCIE are: Costa Rica, El Salvador,
Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua. 70 Each of these members is a
member of the WTO.71
62 See ABOUT CABEI, CABEI, available at http://www.bcie.org/
English/bcie/que hace.php (last visited Apr. 22, 2008).
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 See MEMBER COUNTRIES, CABEI, available at http://www.bcie.org
/english/paises/index.php (last visited Apr. 22, 2008).
66 See CABEI Const. ch. IV.
67 Id. ch. V.
68 Id. ch. VII.
69 See generally CABEI CONST. (stating that no dispute settlement
procedure is in place).
70 See CENTRAL AMERICAN BANK FOR ECONOMIC INTEGRATION,
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, CIA WORLD FACTBOOK 2008 APPx. B,
available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/app
endix/appendix-b.html (last visited Apr. 22, 2008).
71 MEMBERS AND OBSERVERS, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, available
at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis e/tif e/org6_e.htm (last visited
Apr. 22, 2008).
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F. EIB
The Treaty of Rome created the European Investment Bank
(EIB) in 1958, which has since become the banking arm of the
European Union (EU) in terms of funding projects for EU members.
72
All members of the European Investment Bank (EIB) member states
hold shares in the organization and the proceeds from the sales of these
shares are used to finance EIB projects. 73 The EU subjects the EIB to
specific mandates as to the types of projects the EIB must fund and
support, removing much of the discretionary element from its funding
decisions. 74 The EIB focuses its funding measures on supporting
projects within EU member states and on promoting business creation
among its own member states. 75 Outside the EU, the EIB also funds
projects in Asia and Latin America under strict guidance of the EU
itself, again removing much of the discretionary element from its
funding decisions.76
The member states of the EIB are the members of the EU,
namely: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic,
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary,
Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Malta, the Netherlands,
Poland, Portugal, Romania, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain,
Sweden and the United Kingdom.77 All members of the EIB are WTO
members. 8
72 See ABOUT THE EIB, EIB, available at http://www.eib.
org/about/index.htm (last visited Apr. 22, 2008).
73 See MISSION, ABOUT THE EIB, EIB, available at http://www.eib.org
/about/mission/index.htm (last visited Apr. 22, 2008).
74 See STRATEGY, ABOUT THE EIB, EIB, available at http://www.eib.org
/about/strategy/index.htm (last visited Apr. 22, 2008).
75 id.
76 id.
77 See SHAREHOLDERS, EIB, available at http://www.eib.org/about
/structure/shareholders/index.htm (last visited Apr. 22, 2008).
78 MEMBERS AND OBSERVERS, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, available
at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto e/whatis-e/tif e/org6 e.htm (last visited
Apr. 22, 2008).
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G. IADB
The Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) was founded in
1959.79 Its stated purpose is to "contribute to the acceleration of the
process of economic and social development of the regional developing
member countries, individually and collectively. '" 80 To that end, the
IADB funds public and private projects within its borrowing members'
territories, provided that these projects are in accordance with the
guidelines established for IADB funding decisions. 81 All classes of
members have purchased shares in the IADB; the IADB then uses the
purchase price of these shares to contribute to the overall capital of the
IADB.82 At several times throughout its history, the IADB has
83
authorized additional fundraising in order to support certain projects.
The IADB's agreement sets out all limitations and requirements
for IADB loans and other funding-mitigating against the possibility of
retaliatory measures by states brought before the WTO's dispute
settlement body.84 Every member has a seat on the Board of Directors,
ensuring that no state can dominate the decision-making process within
the IADB itself.85 Every IADB member has a vote proportionate to the
number of shares it holds in the bank plus 135.86 Suspension of
membership in the IADB may only occur in certain circumstances,
which are elaborated in the Agreement Establishing the Inter-American
Development Bank. 87 The Board of Executive Directors has
jurisdiction over interpretative questions regarding the Agreement
Establishing the Inter-American Development Bank between either
88
member states or a member state and the IADB. In situations where
former members have disputes with the IADB or where the IADB
disbands and there is a dispute with a member state relevant parties can
resort to arbitration. 89
79 See AGREEMENT ESTABLISHING THE INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT
BANK, Aug. 4, 1959, 10 U.S.T. 3029, 389 U.N.T.S. 69 [hereinafter IADB
Agreement].
80 Id. art. I § 1.
81 Id. § 2.
82 Id. art. II.
83 See id. Prologue.
84 Id. art. III.
85 Id. art. VIII § 2.
86 Id. § 4.
87 Id. art. IX § 2.
88 Id. art. XIII § 1.
89 Id.§2.
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The borrowing members of the IADB are: Argentina, the
Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa
Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala,
Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru,
Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay and Venezuela. 90 With the
exception of the Bahamas, which is currently an observer government
to the WTO, all other borrowing members of the IADB are members of
the WTO.91 Regional non-borrowing members of the IADB are the
United States and Canada;92 both of which are members of the WTO.93
Non-regional non-borrowing members of the IADB are: Austria,
Belgium, Croatia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Israel, Italy,
Japan, Korea, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain,




The Latin American Integration Association (LAIA) was created
in 1980 through the 1980 Montevideo Treaty. 96 LAIA's goal is the
creation of an integrated economic zone within its member states for
90 See CAPITAL STOCK AND VOTING POWER, ABOUT THE IADB, INTER-
AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, available at http://www.iadb.org/aboutus
/IV/go voting.cfmlanguage=English (last visited Apr. 22, 2008).
9F MEMBERS AND OBSERVERS, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, available
at http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/whatis-e/tif e/org6 e.htm (last visited
Apr. 22, 2008).
92 See CAPITAL STOCK AND VOTING POWER, ABOUT THE IADB, INTER-
AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, available at http://www.iadb.org/aboutus
/IV/go voting.cfm?language=English (last visited Apr. 22, 2008).
" MEMBERS AND OBSERVERS, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, available
at http://www.wto.org/English/thewtoe/whatis e/tif e/org6_e.htm (last visited
Apr. 22, 2008).
94 See CAPITAL STOCK AND VOTING POWER, ABOUT THE IADB, INTER-
AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, available at http://www.iadb.org/aboutus
/IV/go voting.cfmn?language=English (last visited Apr. 22, 2008).
" MEMBERS AND OBSERVERS, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, available
at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/whatis-e/tif e/org6_e.htm (last visited
Apr. 22, 2008).
96 See TRATADO DE MONTEVIDEO TREATY, INSTRUMENTO QUE INSTITUYE
LA ASOCIACION LATIONAMERICANA DE INTEGRACI6N, Aug. 12, 1980, available
at http://www.sice.oas.org/trade/Montev-tr/indice.asp [hereinafter LAIA
Agreement].
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the promotion and growth of member economies and societies.97 LAIA
specifically recognizes the differences between the development
statuses of its member states and seeks to facilitate an increase in
development for its lesser developed members while establishing
principles of economic free trade throughout the area. 98 The 1980
Montevideo Treaty provides a list of products for which tariffs will be
reduced or eliminated by member states when they are exported by
other member states, with the proviso that these requirements are
limited in the case of lesser developed members. 99 Under the terms of
the 1980 Montevideo Treaty, LAIA's governing body is the Council of
Ministers of Foreign Affairs, comprised of foreign ministers or their
equivalent from each member state, thus giving each member state
parity in governmental representation at the LAIA level.100 In limited
circumstances relating to the taxation of products that are not
significant parts of a member state's economy, a member state may
bring an issue to the Committee of Representatives for a
determination.' 0 ' Beyond this, however, the 1980 Montevideo Treaty
does not address the settlement of disputes between members.
0 2
The members of LAIA are: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile,
Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and
Venezuela. 0 3 All LAIA members are also members of the WTO with
the exception of Cuba.1
0 4
1. MERCOSUR
MERCOSUR was created in 1991 in order to create a common
market system for member states in the Southern Cone of South
America. 10 5 MERCOSUR's founding documents include provisions
97 Id. Preamble.
98 Id. ch. III.
9 Id. ch. 18- 19.
'oo Id. arts. 28- 31.
o' Id. art. 47.
102 LAIA Agreement, supra note 96.
"' See MEMBER COUNTRIES, LAIA, available at http://www.aladi.org
/nsfaladi/perfil.nsf/inicio2004i?OpenFrameSet&Frame=basefi-m&Src=%2Fnsfa
ladi%2Fperfil.nsfo2Fvsitioweb2004i%2 Fpaises I i%3FOpenDocument%26Aut
oFramed (last visited Apr. 22, 2008).
104 MEMBERS AND OBSERVERS, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, available
at http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/whatis e/tif e/org6 e.htm (last visited
Apr. 22, 2008).
105 See Treaty Establishing a Common Market between the Argentine
Republic, the Federal Republic of Brazil, the Republic of Paraguay and the
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for the free movement and transportation of goods, establishing a
common market and trading policy for MERCOSUR members, and
coordinating the trade policies of member states across a range of
policy areas related to the economy.10 6 MERCOSUR was intended to
work as a complement to LAIA. 10 7 Originally, there was no dispute
settlement provision in MERCOSUR's founding document. 10 8 Later in
1991, MERCOSUR adopted a basic dispute settlement system that was
based on the use of arbitration to settle disputes between member
states. 10 9 In 2002, MERCOSUR adopted a new treaty on the handling
of disputes between its members. 110 The provisions of this treaty are
far more thorough than the prior dispute settlement procedures used by
MERCOSUR. However, the subject matter is limited to disputes
arising out of the implementation of MERCOSUR regulations."'
The member states of MERCOSUR are: Argentina, Brazil,
Paraguay and Uruguay.112 All are members of the WTO. 13
J. OAS
Founded in 1948, the OAS is a regional organization which
exists for the coordination and encouragement of member interaction in
areas such as trade, economic development and cooperation, as well as
Eastern Republic of Uruguay, Mar. 26, 1991, available at http://www.
sice.oas.org/trade/mrcsr/mrcsrtoc.asp (last visited Apr. 22, 2008) (hereinafter
MERCOSUR).
106 See id. art. 1.
107 See id. Preamble.
108 MERCOSUR, supra note 105.
109 See PROTOCOL OF BRASILIA FOR THE SOLUTION OF CONTROVERSIES,
MERCOSUR, available at http://www.sice.oas.org/trade/mrcsr/colonia/pco
lonia s.asp (last visited Apr. 22, 2008).
110 See PROTOCOLO DE OLIVOS PARA LA SOLUCION DE CONTROVERSIAS EN
EL MERCOSUR, MERCOSUR, available at http://www.sice.oas.org/Trade
/MRCSR/olivos/polivoss.asp (last visited Apr. 22, 2008).
... Id. ch. 1 art. 1.
112 MERCOSUR, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, CIA WORLD
FACTBOOK 2008, available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-factbook/appendix/appendix-b.html. (last visited Apr. 22, 2008).
113 Info. & Media Relations Div., World Trade Org., Understanding the
WTO 112 (3d ed. 2007), MEMBERS AND OBSERVERS, WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION, available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/whatis_e
/tif e/org6_e.htm. (last visited Apr. 22, 2008).
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military coordination, legal coordination, and societal harmonization.
14
Throughout its history, the OAS has enacted trade agreements
involving primarily private contract and trading systems. 115 The OAS
has created several committees that examine and promote economic
issues of importance throughout OAS member states."
16
The OAS' Charter is silent on settlement of economic disputes
between member states.' 17 The Charter does provide that the OAS was
created, in part, for the "specific settlement of disputes" between
members. This is generally regarded as applying to situations of state
conflict that could otherwise rise to the level of armed conflicts."
18
Since its founding, the OAS has established several juridical bodies
under its auspices, such as the Inter-American Court of Human Rights;
however, none of these bodies addresses economic or trade disputes
between member states."l 9 Thus, there is no juridical body under the
OAS system to which OAS member states can bring economic or trade-
based disputes. 120 Additionally, there are no legal provisions regarding
the resolution of disputes between OAS member states in either the
OAS Charter or subsequently enacted OAS agreements.' 21 The greatest
means of economic binding in existence between OAS member states
is membership in certain committees, such as SEDI, which operate
under the OAS's auspices to provide economic assistance to certain
114 OAS HISTORY AT A GLANCE, OAS, available at http://www.
oas.org/keyissues/eng/KeylssueDetail.asp?kis sec=17 (last visited Apr. 22,
2008).
115 See SEDI - DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND TOURISM, OAS, available at
http://www.sedi.oas.org/dttc/trade/ (last visited Apr. 22, 2008).
116 See id.; see also SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, KEY ISSUES,
OAS, available at http://www.oas.org/keyissues/eng/KeylssueDetail.asp
?kissec=19 (last visited Apr. 22, 2008)
".. See CHARTER OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, adopted
April 30, 1948, 2 U.S.T. 2394, 119 U.N.T.S. 3, available at
http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/charter.html. (last visited Apr. 22, 2008).
118 Id.
119 Id. ch. V.
120 See INTER-AMERICAN JURIDICAL COMMITTEE, OAS, available at
http://www.oas.org/cji/eng/interamericanjuridical committee.htm (last
visited Apr. 22, 2008); INFORMATION, INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN
RIGHTS, available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/historia.cfm (follow "version
Espahiol" hyperlink) (last visited Apr. 22, 2008).
121 See CHARTER OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, supra
note 117, available at http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/charter.html (last
visited Apr. 22, 2008).
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member states. 12z Even within these entities, there is no punitive
mechanism for states that bring disputes to the WTO. 123 Further, the
methods of sanctioning or removing an OAS member state, as set forth
in the OAS Charter, would generally preclude seeking any such actions
against a member state because of its actions at the WTO unless these
actions posed a serious and demonstrable threat to the OAS and its
member states as a whole.
124
The members of the OAS are: Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina,
the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile,
Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica, the Dominican Republic,
Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras,
Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, St. Kitts and
Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad
and Tobago, the United States, Uruguay and Venezuela. 125  Cuba
remains a nominal member of the OAS, although much of its abilities
have been curtailed since the Cuban Revolution.' 26 All OAS member
states except for the Bahamas and Cuba are members of the WTO.
127
The Bahamas is currently a WTO observer government and is in the
process of acceding to the WTO.
1 28
K. SAARC
The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation was
founded in 1985.129 There are two major agreements relating to trade
between SAARC members: the Agreement on SAARC Preferential
122 See SEDI - DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND TOURISM, OAS, available at
http://www.sedi.oas.org/dttc/trade/ (last visited Apr. 22, 2008).
123 See id.
124 See CHARTER OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, supra
note 117, available at http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/charter.html (last
visited Apr. 22, 2008).
125 OAS MEMBER STATES AND PERMANENT MISSIONS, OAS, available at
http://www.oas.org/documents/eng/memberstates.asp (last visited Apr. 22,
2008)
126 See id.
127 MEMBERS AND OBSERVERS, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, INFO. &
MEDIA RELATIONS DIv., WORLD TRADE ORG., supra note 113, at 112, available
at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/whatis e/tif e/org6_e.htm. (last visited
Apr. 22, 2008).
128 Id.
129 SOUTH ASIAN ASSOCIATION FOR REGIONAL COOPERATION, available
at http://www.saarc-sec.org/main.php (last visited Apr. 22, 2008).
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Trading Arrangement (SAPTA )130 and the Agreement on South Asian
Trade Areas (SAFTA ).131
SAPTA, which was enacted before SAFTA, provides many of
the same trade protections that GATT seeks to provide on a global
level, specifically most favored nation status, safeguard prohibitions,
and easing of the applicable tariff regimes in each member state .I32
SAPTA provides that member state disputes "regarding the
interpretation and application" of SAPTA itself or any subsequent
economic agreements would be referred to a governing committee,
which would settle the dispute in the event that the members
themselves could not. 133 Apart from directing such a committee to
create rules for the handling of disputes, the provisions addressing
dispute settlement provide no further guidance.'
34
SAFTA was enacted several years after SAPTA with the goal of
furthering SAPTA's economic provisions. 135 Interestingly, SAFTA
explicitly endorses the WTO structure and the obligations of SAARC's
members under it.' 36 Such an endorsement necessarily includes the
rights of SAARC's members to seek redress against each other and
other WTO members pursuant to the WTO dispute settlement
procedure. SAFTA is more explicit than SAPTA in regards to the
obligations of SAARC members to liberalize their trading regimes, yet
SAFTA still takes into account the uneven development status of its
member states by making special, less onerous provisions for lesser
developed member states. 137 SAFTA's dispute settlement provisions
are far more evolved than those contained in SAPTA.131 SAFTA
provides for a dispute settlement procedure that in many ways mirrors
the WTO's dispute settlement apparatus. 139 Although SAFTA requires
130 AGREEMENT ON SAARC PREFERENTIAL TRADING ARRANGEMENT
(SAPTA), SAARC, available at http://www.saarc-sec.org/data/agenda/econ
omic/sapta/sapta.pdf (last visited Apr. 22, 2008).
'J AGREEMENT ON SOUTH AsIAN FREE TRADE AREA (SAFTA), SAARC,
available at http://www.saarc-sec.org/data/summitl2/saftaagreement.pdf (last
visited Apr. 22, 2008) [hereinafter SAFTA].
132 See generally AGREEMENT ON SAARC PREFERENTIAL TRADING
ARRANGEMENT (SAPTA), SAARC, available at http://www.saarc-sec.org
/data/agenda/economic/sapta/sapta.pdf (last visited Apr. 22, 2008).
1f3 Id. art. 20.134 id.
13 See SAFTA, supra note 131.
136 Id. art. 3.
131 Id. art. 3.
138 Id. art. 20.
139 id.
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that disputes regarding the "interpretation and application" of SAFTA
and subsequent SAARC agreements "will be amicably settled among
the parties concerned through a process initiated by a request for
bilateral consultations,"'' 40 nothing in its dispute resolution provisions
prohibits a member state from taking a dispute to the WTO.
141
The members of SAARC include Afghanistan, Bangladesh,
Bhutan, India, the Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka.
142
Bangladesh, India, the Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka are
members of the WTO.143 Afghanistan and Bhutan are currently WTO
observer governments. 144
IV. CORRELATIONS BETWEEN MEMBERSHIP IN REGIONAL
ECONOMIC ORGANIZATIONS AND WTO DISPUTES
Slightly more than half of the disputes brought before the WTO's
dispute settlement body are brought by states that share membership
145
in a regional or regional economic organization with the state against
which the complaint is brought. 146 These disputes will be examined
140 Id.
141 See AGREEMENT ON SOUTH ASIAN FREE TRADE AREA, SAARC,
available at http://www.saarc-sec.org/printable.php?id=l 2 (last visited Apr. 22,
2008).
142 See SOUTH ASIAN ASSOCIATION FOR REGIONAL COOPERATION,
available at http://www.saarc-sec.org/main.php (last visited Apr. 22, 2008).
143 MEMBERS AND OBSERVERS, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, available
at http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/whatis-e/tif e/org6_e.htm (last visited
Apr. 22, 2008).
144 Id.
145 Many other WTO disputes involve states that share the status of an
observer or non-regional member in the regional and regional economic
organizations profiled above. These disputes have been excluded from analysis
in this article because of the author's belief that merely being an observer
nation or non-regional member of these organizations does not provide the
same possibility for peer pressure with the organization generally.
146 See generally WTO: DISPUTE SETTLEMENT, CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF
DISPUTES CASES, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/ dispue/dispu status e.htm (last visited
Apr, 27, 2008). Specifically, these disputes are: 371 (Philippines, Thailand);
368 (China, US); 367 (NZ, Australia); 366 (Panama, Colombia); 365 (Brazil,
US); 363 (US, China); 362 (US, China); 359 (Mexico, China); 358 (US,
China); 357 (Canada, US); 356 (Argentina, Chile); 355 (Argentina, Brazil); 351
(Argentina, Chile); 348 (Panama, Colombia); 346 (Argentina, US); 344
(Mexico, US); 343 (Thailand, US); 342 (Canada, Chile); 340 (US, China); 338
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(US, Canada); 336 (Korea, Japan); 335 (Ecuador, US); 333 (Costa Rica, DR);
331 (Guatemala, Mexico); 329 (Mexico, Panama); 325 (Mexico, US); 324
(Thailand, US); 323 (Korea, Japan); 322 (Japan, US); 318 (Taiwan, India); 312
(Indonesia, Korea); 311 (Canada, US); 310 (Canada, US); 309 (US, China);
308 (US, Mexico); 306 (Bangladesh, India); 303 (Chile, Ecuador); 302
(Honduras, DR); 300 (Honduras, DR); 298 (Guatemala, Mexico); 296 (Korea,
US); 295 (US, Mexico); 292 (Canada, EC); 289 (Poland, Czech); 285 (Antigua,
US); 284 (Nicaragua, Mexico); 282 (Mexico, US); 281 (Mexico, US); 270
(Mexico, US); 278 (Argentina, Chile); 277 (Canada, US); 276 (US, Canada);
275 (US, Venezuela); 274 (Taiwan, US); 272 (Argentina, Peru); 271
(Philippines, Australia); 270 (Philippines, Australia); 268 (Argentina, US); 267
(Brazil, US); 264 (Canada, US); 261 (Chile, Uruguay); 259 (Brazil, US); 258
(NZ, US); 257 (Canada, US); 255 (Chile, Peru); 254 (Norway, US); 253
(Switzerland, US); 252 (China, US); 251 (Korea, US); 250 (Brazil, US); 249
(Japan, US); 247 (Canada, US); 245 (US, Japan); 244 (Japan, US); 241 (Brazil,
Argentina); 240 (Hungary, Romania); 239 (Brazil, US); 238 (Chile, Argentina);
236 (Canada, US); 235 (Poland, Slovakia); 234 (Canada & Mexico v. US); 232
(Chile, Mexico); 231 (Peru, EC); 230 (Colombia, Chile); 228 (Colombia,
Chile); 227 (Chile, Peru); 226 (Argentina, Chile); 224 (Brazil, US); 222
(Brazil, Canada); 221 (Canada, US); 220 (Guatemala, Chile); 218 (Brazil, US);
217 (Australia, Brazil, Chile, EC, India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Thailand v.
US); 216 (Brazil, Mexico); 215 (Korea, Philippines); 210 (US, Belgium); 207
(Argentina, Chile); 204 (US, Mexico); 203 (US, Mexico); 202 (Korea, US);
201 (Honduras, Nicaragua); 199 (US, Brazil); 197 (US, Brazil); 196 (US,
Argentina); 195 (US, Philippines); 194 (Canada, US); 190 (Brazil, Argentina);
188 (Colombia, Nicaragua); 187 (Costa Rica, Trinidad); 185 (Costa Rica,
Trinidad); 184 (Japan, US); 182 (Mexico, Ecuador); 180 (Canada, US); 179
(Korea, US); 178 (Australia, US); 177 (NZ, US); 173 (US, France); 171 (US,
Argentina); 170 (US, Canada); 169 (Australia, Korea); 167 (Canada, US);164
(US, Argentina); 163 (US, Korea); 162 (Japan, US); 161 (US, Korea); 156
(Mexico, Guatemala); 144 (Canada, US); 139 (Japan, Canada); 132 (US,
Mexico); 131 (US, France); 128 (US, Netherlands); 127 (US, Belgium); 126
(US, Australia); 112 (Brazil, Peru); Il1 (Argentina, US); 110 (EC, Chile); 109
(US, Chile); 106 (US, Australia); 103 (US, Canada); 102 (US, Philippines); 101
(US, Mexico); 99 (Korea, US); 97 (Chile, US); 95 (Japan, US); 93 (NZ, India);
91 (Australia, India); 89 (Korea, US); 86 (US, Sweden); 84 (US, Korea); 83
(US, Denmark); 80 (US, Belgium); 78 (Colombia, US); 76 (US, Japan); 74
(US, Philippines); 71 (Brazil, Canada); 70 (Brazil, Canada); 67 (US, UK); 65
(US, Brazil); 64 (Japan, Indonesia); 61 (Philippines, US); 60 (Mexico,
Guatemala); 59 (US, Indonesia); 58 (India, Malaysia, Pakistan, Thailand v.
US); 57 (US, Australia); 56 (US, Argentina); 55 (Japan, Indonesia); 52 (US,
Brazil); 51 (Japan, Brazil); 49 (Mexico, US); 46 (Canada, Brazil); 45 (US,
Japan); 44 (US, Japan); 41 (US, Korea); 37 (US, Portugal); 31 (US, Canada);
28 (US, Japan); 24 (Costa Rica, US); 23 (Mexico, Venezuela); 21 (US,
Australia); 20 (Canada, Korea); 11 (US, Japan); 10 (Canada, Japan); 6 (Japan,
US); 5 (US, Korea); 4 (Brazil, US); 3 (US, Korea); 2 (Venezuela, US); I
(Singapore, Malaysia).
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through three different prisms in this Part. First, they will be examined
for general trends in the states that have brought disputes before the
WTO dispute settlement body and their membership in regional or
regional economic groups. Second, they will be examined in terms of
the subject matter areas in which complaints have been brought against
other members of the same regional or regional economic
organization(s) as the complainant state. And third, they will be
examined in terms of outcome after appearing before the WTO dispute
settlement body.
In all of these examinations, the activities of members of each of
the above-discussed regional and regional economic organizations are
evaluated individually, although - where there is a commonality in
membership - it is rare that a complaint involved states which share
only one membership in common. This method of evaluation has been
used to gain insights into the activities of the membership of each
regional and regional economic organization as a distinct entity.
However, this examination also references the common pairings of
membership commonalities and disputes before the WTO in order to
demonstrate the strengths and weaknesses of the above-discussed
regional and regional economic organizations in tandem.
A. GENERAL TRENDS IN COMPLAINTS
Since the inception of the WTO dispute settlement process, there
have been three hundred seventy-one complaints filed with the
WTO. 147 As discussed below, these complaints have covered a wide
range of trade law and policy areas and have resulted in a variety of
outcomes, some of which were years in the making.
Of the complaints brought to the WTO dispute settlement body, a
majority of involved WTO member states shared at least one common
affiliation as primary members of a regional or regional economic
organization.148 The following information should be framed within
the understanding that, at times, a WTO member state has brought suit
against a state with which it shares multiple regional or regional
economic organization affiliations. Members of the OAS 149 and
147 id.
148 Id.
149 Id. Specifically, these disputes were: DS 366 (Panama, Colombia);
DS 365 (Brazil, US); DS 357 (Canada, US); DS 356 (Argentina, Chile); DS
355 (Argentina Brazil); DS 351 (Argentina, Chile); DS 348 (Panama,
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APEC 150 have brought complaints against each other most frequently in
the WTO setting.' 5' Rounding out the top three most commonly shared
Colombia); DS 346 (Argentina, US); DS 344 (Mexico, US); DS 338 (US,
Canada); DS 335 (Ecuador, US); DS 333 (Costa Rica, DR); DS 331
(Guatemala, Mexico); DS 329 (Mexico, Panama); DS 325 (Mexico, US); DS
311 (Canada, US); DS 310 (Canada, US); DS 308 (US, Mexico); DS 303
(Chile, Ecuador); DS 302 (Honduras, DR); DS 300 (Honduras, DR); DS 298
(Guatemala, Mexico); DS 295 (US, Mexico); DS 285 (Antigua, US); DS 284
(Nicaragua, US); DS 282 (Mexico, US); DS 281 (Mexico, US); DS 280
(Mexico, US); DS 278 (Argentina, US); DS 277 (Canada, US); DS 276 (US,
Canada); DS 275 (US, Venezuela); DS 272 (Argentina, Peru); DS 268
(Argentina, US); DS 267 (Brazil, US); DS 264 (Canada, US); DS 261 (Chile,
Uruguay); DS 259 (Brazil, US); DS 257 (Canada, Mexico); DS 255 (Chile,
Peru); DS 250 (Brazil, US); DS 247 (Canada, US); DS 241 (Brazil, Argentina);
DS 239 (Brazil, US); DS 238 (Chile, Argentina); DS 236 (Canada, US); DS
234 (Canada & Mexico v. US); DS 232 (Chile, Mexico); DS 230 (Colombia,
Chile); DS 228 (Colombia, Chile); DS 227 (Chile, Peru); DS 226 (Argentina,
Chile); DS 224 (Brazil, US); DS 222 (Brazil, Canada); DS 221 (Canada, US);
DS 220 (Guatemala, Chile); DS 218 (Brazil, US); DS 216 (Brazil, Mexico); DS
207 (Argentina, Chile); DS 204 (US, Mexico); DS 203 (US, Mexico); DS 201
(Honduras, Nicaragua); DS 199 (US, Brazil); DS 197 (US, Brazil); DS 196
(US, Argentina); DS 194 (Canada, US); DS 190 (Brazil, Argentina); DS 188
(Colombia, Nicaragua); DS 187 (Costa Rica, Trinidad); DS 185 (Costa Rica,
Trinidad); DS 182 (Mexico, Ecuador); DS 180 (Canada, US); DS 171 (US,
Argentina);DS 170 (US, Canada); DS 167 (Canada, US); DS 164 (US,
Argentina); DS 156 (Mexico, Guatemala); DS 144 (Canada, US); DS 132 (US,
Mexico); DS 112 (Brazil, Peru); DS 111 (Argentina, US); DS 109 (US, Chile);
DS 103 (US, Canada); DS 101 (US, Mexico); DS 97 (Chile, US); DS 78
(Colombia, US); DS 71 (Brazil, Canada); DS 70 (Brazil, Canada); DS 65 (US,
Brazil); DS 60 (Mexico, Guatemala); DS 56 (US, Argentina); DS 52 (US,
Brazil); DS 49 (Mexico, US; DS 46 (Canada, Brazil); DS 31 (US, Canada); DS
24 (Costa Rica, US); DS 23 (Mexico, Venezuela); DS 4 (Brazil, US); DS 2
(Venezuela, US).
150 Id. Specifically, these disputes were: DS 371(Philippines, Thailand);
DS 368 (China, US); DS 367 (NZ, Australia); DS 363 (US, China); DS 362
(US, China); DS 359 (Mexico, China); DS 358 (US, China); DS 357 (Canada,
US); DS 344 (Mexico, US); DS 343 (Thailand, US); DS 342 (Canada, China);
DS 340 (US, Canada); DS 338 (US, Canada); DS 336 (Korea, Japan); DS 325
(Mexico, US); DS 324 (Thailand, US); DS 323 (Korea, Japan); DS 322 (Japan,
US); DS 312 (Indonesia, Korea); DS 309 (US, China); DS 308 (US. Mexico);
DS 296 (Korea, US); DS 295 (US, Mexico); DS 282 (Mexico, US); DS 281
(Mexico, US); DS 280 (Mexico, US); DS 277 (Canada, US); DS 276 (US,
Canada); DS 274 (Taiwan, US); DS 271 (Philippines, Australia); DS 270
(Philippines, Australia); DS 264 (Canada, US); DS 258 (NZ, US); DS 257
(Canada, US); DS 255 (Chile, Peru); DS 252 (China, US); DS 251 (Korea,
US); DS 249 (Japan, US); DS 247 (Canada, US); DS 245 (US, Mexico); DS
244 (Japan, US); DS 236 (Canada, US); DS 234 (Canada & Mexico, US); DS
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regional and regional economic organization membership affiliations in
the WTO dispute settlement body setting is the IADB. Although the
frequency with which members of the IADB brought complaints
against each other to the WTO dispute settlement body is far less than
that of OAS and APEC members. 152  LAIA members brought
232 (Chile, Mexico); DS 227 (Chile, Peru); DS 221 (Canada, US); DS 217
(Australia, Brazil, Chile, EC, India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Thailand v. US);
DS 215 (Korea v. Philippines); DS 204 (US, Mexico); DS 203 (US, Mexico);
DS 202 (Korea, US); DS 195 (US, Philippines); DS 194 (Canada, US); DS 184
(Japan, US); DS 180 (Canada, US); DS 179 (Korea, US); DS 178 (Australia,
US); DS 177 (NZ, US); DS 170 (US, Canada); DS 169 (Australia, Korea); DS
167 (Canada, US); DS 163 (US, Korea); DS 162 (Japan, US); DS 161 (US,
Korea); DS 144 (Canada, US); DS 139 (Japan, Canada); DS 132 (US, Mexico);
DS 126 (US, Australia); DS 109 (US, Chile); DS 106 (US, Australia); DS 103
(US, Canada); DS 102 (US, Philippines); DS 101 (US, Mexico); DS 99 (Korea,
US); DS 97 (Chile, US); DS 95 (Japan, US); DS 89 (Korea, US); DS 84 (US,
Korea); DS 76 (US, Japan); DS 74 (US, Philippines); DS 64 (Japan, Indonesia);
DS 61 (Philippines, US); DS 59 (US, Indonesia); DS 58 (India, Malaysia,
Pakistan, Thailand v. US); DS 57 (US, Australia); DS 55 (Japan, Indonesia);
DS 49 (Mexico, US); DS 45 (US, Japan); DS 44 (US, Japan); DS 41 (US,
Korea); DS 28 (US, Japan); DS 27 (Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico v.
US); DS 21 (US, Australia); DS 20 (Canada, Korea); DS 11 (US, Japan); DS
10 (Canada, Japan); DS 6 (Japan, US); DS 5 (US, Korea); DS 3 (US, Korea);
DS 1 (Singapore, Malaysia).
151 Id.
152 Id. Specifically, these disputes were: DS 366 (Panama, Colombia);
365 (Brazil, US); DS 357 (Canada, US); DS 356 (Argentina, Chile); DS 355
(Argentina, Brazil); DS 351 (Argentina, Chile); DS 348 (Panama, Colombia);
DS 346 (Argentina, US); DS 344 (Mexico, US); DS 338 (US, Canada); DS 335
(Ecuador, US); DS 331 (Guatemala, Mexico); DS 329 (Mexico, Panama); DS
325 (Mexico, US); DS 322 (Japan, US); DS 311 (Canada, US); DS 310
(Canada, US); DS 308 (US, Mexico); DS 303 (Chile, Ecuador); DS 298
(Guatemala, Mexico); DS 295 (US, Mexico); DS 284 (Nicaragua, Mexico); DS
282 (Mexico, US); DS 281 (Mexico, US); DS 280 (Mexico, US); DS 278
(Argentina, Chile); DS 276 )US, Canada); DS 275 (US, Venezuela); DS 272
(Argentina, Peru); DS 268 (Argentina, US); DS 267 (Brazil, US); DS 264
(Canada, US); DS 261 (Chile, Uruguay); DS 259 (Brazil, US); DS 257
(Canada, US); DS 255 (Chile, Peru); DS 254 (Norway, US); DS 253
(Switzerland, US); DS 250 (Brazil, US); DS 249 (Japan, US); DS 247 (Canada,
US); DS 245 (US, Japan); DS 244 (Japan, US); DS 241 (Brazil, Argentina); DS
239 (Brazil, US); DS 238 (Chile, Argentina); DS 236 (Canada, US); DS 234
(Canada & Mexico v. US); DS 232 (Chile, Mexico); DS 230 (Colombia,
Chile); DS 228 (Colombia, Chile); DS 227 (Chile, Peru); DS 226 (Argentina,
Chile); DS 224 (Brazil, US); DS 222 (Brazil, Canada); DS 221 (Canada, US);
DS 220 (Guatemala, Chile); DS 218 (Brazil, US); DS 217 (Australia, Brazil,
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complaints against each other over twenty times153 and members of the
ADB brought complaints against each other more than ten times.
1 54
Members of MERCOSUR have brought two complaints against each
other 155 and the EIB have brought complaints against each other three
times.156 Members of ASEAN 157 have brought complaints against each
Chile, EC, India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Thailand v. US); DS 216 (Brazil,
Mexico); DS 210 (US, Belgium); DS 207 (Argentina, Chile); DS 204 (US,
Mexico); DS 203 (US, Mexico); DS 201 (Honduras, Nicaragua); DS 199 (US,
Brazil); DS 197 (US, Brazil); DS 196 (US, Argentina); DS 194 (Canada, US);
DS 190 (Brazil, Argentina); DS 188 (Colombia, Nicaragua); DS 187 (Costa
Rica, Trinidad); DS 185 (Costa Rica, Trinidad); DS 184 (Japan, US); DS 180
(Canada, US); DS 173 (US, France); DS 171 (US, Argentina); DS 170 (US,
Canada); DS 167 (Canada, US); DS 164 (US, Argentina); DS 162 (Japan, US);
DS 156 (Mexico, Guatemala); DS 144 (Canada, US); DS 139 (Japan, Canada);
DS 132 (US, Mexico); DS 131 (US, France); DS 128 (US, Netherlands); DS
127 (US, Belgium); DS 112 (Brazil, Peru); DS 111 (Argentina, US); DS 109
(US, Chile); DS 103 (US, Canada); DS 101 (US, Mexico); DS 97 (Chile, US);
DS 95 (Japan, US); DS 86 (US, Sweden); DS 83 (US, Denmark); DS 80 (US,
Belgium); DS 78 (Colombia, US); DS 76 (US, Japan); DS 71 (Brazil, Canada);
DS 70 (Brazil, Canada); DS 67 (US, UK); DS 65 (US, Brazil); DS 60 (Mexico,
Guatemala); DS 56 (US, Argentina); DS 52 (US, Brazil); DS 51 (Japan,
Brazil); DS 49 (Mexico, US); DS 45 (US, Japan); DS 44 (US, Japan); DS 37
(US, Portugal); DS 31 (US, Canada); DS 28 (US, Japan); DS 24 (Costa Rica,
US); DS 23 (Mexico, Venezuela); DS 11 (US, Japan); DS 10 (Canada, Japan);
DS 6 (Japan, US); DS 4 (Brazil, US); DS 2 (Venezuela, US).
153 Id. Specifically, these disputes were: 366 (Panama, Colombia); 356
(Argentina, Chile); 355 (Argentina, Brazil); 351 (Argentina, Chile); 303 (Chile,
Ecuador); 284 (Nicaragua, Mexico); 278 (Argentina, Chile); 272 (Argentina,
Peru); 261 (Chile, Uruguay); 255 (Chile, Peru); 241 (Brazil, Argentina); 238
(Chile, Argentina); 232 (Chile, Mexico); 230 (Colombia. Chile); 228
(Colombia, Chile); 227 (Chile, Peru); 226 (Argentina, Chile); 216 (Brazil,
Uruguay); 207 (Argentina, Chile) 190 (Brazil, Argentina); 188 (Colombia,
Nicaragua); 182 (Mexico, Ecuador); 112 (Brazil, Peru).
154 Id. Specifically, these disputes were: 371(Philippines, Thailand); 367
(NZ, Australia); 336 (Korea, Japan); 323 (Korea, Japan); 318 (Taiwan, India);
312 (Indonesia, Korea); 306 (Bangladesh, India); 271 (Philippines, Australia);
270 (Philippines, Australia); 215 (Korea, Philippines); 169 (Australia, Korea);
93 (NZ, India); 91 (Australia, India); 64 (Japan, Indonesia); 55 (Japan,
Indonesia); I (Singapore, Malaysia).
155 Id. Specifically, these disputes were: 355 (Argentina, Brazil); 190
(Brazil, Argentina).
156 Id. Specifically, these disputes were: 289 (Poland, Czech); 240
(Hungary, Romania); 235 (Poland, Slovakia).
157 Id. Specifically, these disputes were: 371 (Philippines, Thailand); 1
(Singapore, Malaysia).
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other twice, while members of BCIE,5 8 SAARC,"5 9 and CACM 160 have
brought suit against each other once.'
6 1
Meaningful trends can also be observed in the times when states
that are members of multiple regional or regional economic
organizations file disputes against states which are members of these
same organizations. The most frequent combination of organization
membership to appear before the WTO dispute resolution body is the
combination of IADB and OAS members. This combination has
appeared before the WTO dispute resolution body nearly forty times.
162
The combination of APEC, IADB, and OAS has appeared before the
WTO dispute resolution body thirty times.' 63 The combination of
members of IADB, LAIA, and the OAS has appeared before the WTO
dispute resolution body sixteen times, 164 while the combination of
158 Id. Specifically, this dispute was: 201 (Honduras, Nicaragua).
'59 Id. Specifically, this dispute was: 306 (Bangladesh, India).
160 Id. Specifically, this dispute was: 201 (Honduras, Nicaragua).
161 Id.
162 See generally supra note 146. Specifically, these disputes were: 365
(Brazil, US); 348 (Panama, Colombia); 346 (Argentina, US); 331 (Guatemala,
Mexico); 329 (Mexico, Panama); 311 (Canada, US); 310 (Canada, US); 298
(Guatemala, Mexico); 275 (US, Venezuela); 268 (Argentina, US); 267 (Brazil,
US); 259 (Brazil, US); 250 (Brazil, US); 239 (Brazil, US); 224 (Brazil, US);
222 (Brazil, Canada); 218 (Brazil, US); 199 (US, Brazil); 197 (US, Brazil); 196
(US, Argentina); 187 (Costa Rica, Trinidad); 195 (Costa Rica, Trinidad); 171
(US, Argentina); 164 (US, Argentina); 156 (Mexico, Guatemala); 112 (Brazil,
Peru); 111 (Argentina, US); 78 (Colombia, US); 71 (Brazil, Canada); 70
(Brazil, Canada); 65 (US, Brazil); 60 (Mexico, Guatemala); 56 (US,
Argentina); 52 (US, Brazil); 31 (US, Canada); 24 (Costa Rica, US); 23
(Mexico, Venezuela); 4 (Brazil, US); 2 (Venezuela, US).
163 Id. Specifically, these disputes are: 357 (Canada, US); 344 (Mexico,
US); 338 (US, Canada); 335 (Ecuador, US); 325 (Mexico, US); 308 (US,
Mexico); 295 (US, Mexico); 282 (Mexico, US); 281 (Mexico, US); 280
(Mexico, US); 276 (US, Canada); 264 (Canada, US); 257 (Canada, US); 247
(Canada, US); 236 (Canada, US); 234 (Canada & Mexico v. US); 221 (Canada,
US); 204 (US, Mexico); 203 (US, Mexico); 194 (Canada, US); 180 (Canada,
US); 170 (US, Canada); 167 (Canada, US); 144 (Canada, US); 132 (US,
Mexico); 109 (US, Chile); 103 (US, Canada); 101 (US, Mexico); 97 (Chile,
US); 49 (Mexico, US).
164 Id. Specifically, these disputes are: 366 (Panama, Colombia); 356
(Argentina, Chile); 351 (Argentina, Chile); 303 (Chile, Ecuador); 284
(Nicaragua, Mexico); 278 (Argentina, Chile); 272 (Argentina, Peru); 261
(Chile, Uruguay); 238 (Chile, Argentina); 230 (Colombia, Chile); 228
(Colombia, Chile); 226 (Argentina, Chile); 216 (Brazil, Mexico); 207
(Argentina, Chile); 188 (Colombia, Nicaragua); 182 (Mexico, Ecuador).
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membership in IADB and APEC has appeared before the WTO dispute
resolution body fourteen times 165 and the combination of ADB and
APEC members have appeared before the WTO dispute resolution
body twelve times.' 66 The combination of APEC, IADB, LAIA, and
OAS 167 members and the combination of IADB, LAIA, MERCUSOR
and OAS168 members have appeared before the WTO dispute resolution
body three times. 169 The combination of ADB, APEC, and ASEAN
members has appeared before the WTO dispute resolution body
twice, 170 while the combinations of ADB and SAARC, 171 APEC and
OAS, 172 and CACM, IADB, and OAS173 have each appeared once
before the WTO dispute resolution body.'
74
B. TOPIC TRENDS
To better understand the nature of the complaints brought before
the WTO dispute settlement body, these complaints have been broken
down into the following classifications: anti-dumping measures,
classification, countervailing duties, customs, distribution, sale and
transportation of goods, export-specific issues, general system of
preferences, governmental action disputes, imports, inspections,
165 Id. Specifically, these disputes were: 322 (Japan, US); 249 (Japan,
US); 245 (US, Japan); 244 (Japan, US); 217 (Australia, Brazil, Chile, EC,
India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Thailand v. US); 184 (Japan, US); 162 (Japan,
US); 139 (Japan, Canada); 95 (Japan, US); 76 (US, Japan); 28 (US, Japan); 11
(US, Japan); 10 (Canada, Japan); 6 (Japan, US). It is important to note that
Japan was a party to each of these disputes.
166 Id. Specifically, these disputes were: 367 (NZ, Australia); 336
(Korea, Japan); 323 (Korea, Japan); 312 (Indonesia, Korea); 271 (Philippines,
Australia); 270 (Philippines, Australia); 215 (Korea, Philippines); 169
(Australia, Korea); 64 (Japan, Indonesia); 55 (Japan, Indonesia); 45 (US,
Japan); 44 (US, Japan).
167 Id. Specifically, these disputes were: 255 (Chile, Peru); 232 (Chile,
Mexico); 227 (Chile, Peru). Notably, each of these disputes involved Chile as
the complainant.
168 Id. Specifically, these disputes were: 355 (Argentina, Brazil); 241
(Brazil, Argentina); 190 (Brazil, Argentina).
169 Id.
170 See supra note 146. Specifically, these disputes were: 371
(Philippines, Thailand); I (Singapore, Malaysia).
'1 Id. Specifically, this dispute was: 306 (Bangladesh, India).
172 Id. Specifically, this dispute was: 277 (Canada, US).
173 Id. Specifically, this dispute was: 201 (Honduras, Nicaragua).
174 See supra note 146.
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intellectual property, procurement, safeguards, specific product
measures, standards, subsidies, and tariffs.
Members of the OAS 175 and IADB 17 6 have brought more than
thirty complaints relating to anti-dumping measures. 177  APEC
members have brought more than twenty such complaints. 178 In
descending order, members of LAIA, 179 the ADB, 18 ° MERCOSUR,"'8
175 See INDEX OF DISPUTE ISSUES, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION,
available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/dispu e/dispusubj ects_
index_e.htm (last visited Apr. 27, 2008). Specifically, these disputes were: 355
(Argentina, Brazil); 346 (Argentina, US); 344 (Mexico, US); 338 (US,
Canada); 335 (Ecuador, US); 331 (Guatemala, Mexico); 325 (Mexico, US);
295 (US, Mexico); 282 (Mexico, US); 281 (Mexico, US); 277 (Canada, US);
272 (Argentina, Peru); 268 (Argentina, US); 264 (Canada, US); 247 (Canada,
US); 241 (Brazil, Argentina); 239 (Brazil, US); 234 (Canada & Mexico v. US);
221 (Canada, US); 217 (Australia, Brazil, Chile, EC, India, Indonesia, Japan,
Korea, Thailand v. US); 216 (Brazil, Mexico); 203 (US, Mexico); 197 (US,
Brazil); 187 (Costa Rica, Trinidad); 185 (Costa Rica, Trinidad); 182 (Mexico,
Ecuador); 156 (Mexico, Guatemala); 132 (US, Mexico); 102 (US, Philippines);
60 (Mexico, Guatemala); 49 (Mexico, US); 23 (Mexico, Venezuela).
176 Id. Specifically, these disputes were: 355 (Argentina, Brazil); 346
(Argentina, US); 344 (Mexico, US); 338 (US, Canada); 335 (Ecuador, US);
331 (Guatemala, Mexico); 325 (Mexico, US); 322 (Thailand, US); 295 (US,
Mexico); 282 (Mexico, US); 281 (Mexico, US);272 (Argentina, Peru); 268 (;
264 (Canada, US); 247 (Canada, US); 244 (Japan, US); 241 (Brazil,
Argentina); 239 (Brazil, US); 234 (Canada & Mexico v. US); 221 (Canada,
US); 217 (Australia, Brazil, Chile, EC, India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Thailand
v. US); 216 (Brazil, Mexico); 203 (US, Mexico); 197 (US, Brazil); 187 (Costa
Rica, Trinidad); 185 (Costa Rica, Trinidad); 184 (Japan, US); 182 (Mexico,
Ecuador); 162 (Japan, US); 156 (Mexico, Venezuela); 132 (US, Mexico); 102
(US, Philippines); 60 (Mexico, Guatemala); 49 (Mexico, US); 23 (Mexico,
Venezuela).
177 id.
178 See supra note 175. Specifically, these disputes were: 368 (China,
US); 344 (Mexico, US); 338 (US, Canada); 325 (Mexico, US); 324 (Thailand,
US); 322 (Japan, US); 312 (Indonesia, Korea); 295 (US, Mexico); 282
(Mexico, US); 281 (Mexico, US); 277 (Canada, US); 264 (Canada, US); 247
(Canada, US); 244 (Japan, US); 234 (Canada & Mexico v. US); 221 (Canada,
US); 217 (Australia, Brazil, Chile, EC, India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Thailand
v. US); 215 (Korea, Philippines); 203 (US, Mexico); 184 (Japan, US); 179
(Korea, US); 162 (Japan, US); 132 (US, Mexico); 102 (US, Philippines); 99
(Korea, US); 89 (Korea, US); 49 (Mexico, US).
179 Id. Specifically, these disputes were: 355 (Argentina, Brazil); 272
(Argentina, Peru); 241 (Brazil, Argentina); 216 (Brazil, Mexico); 182 (Mexico,
Ecuador).
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and SAARC182 have also brought complaints regarding anti-dumping
measures. 
183
Members of APEC,184 the IADB'85 and OAS 186 have each
brought one complaint regarding classifications.
1 87
In descending order, members of OAS,
1 88 IADB, 189 APEC, 190
LAIA,' 9 ' and the ADB1 92 have brought complaints involving
countervailing duties.
1 93
IADB members have brought complaints against each other for
customs issues four times,194 while members of the ADB,195 APEC, 9 6
ASEAN,1 97 LAIA, 198 and the OAS 199 have brought one complaint in
regards to Customs.
20 0
180 Id. Specifically, these disputes were: 318 (Taiwan, India); 312
(Indonesia, Korea); 306 (Bangladesh, India); 215 (Korea, Philippines).
181 Id. Specifically, these disputes were: 355 (Argentina, Brazil); 241
(Brazil, Argentina).
182 Id. Specifically, this dispute was: 306 (Bangladesh, India).
183 Id.
184 See supra note 175, Specifically, this dispute was: 180 (Canada, US).
185 Id. Specifically, this dispute was: 180 (Canada, US).
186 Id. Specifically, this dispute was: 180 (Canada, US).
187 Id.
188 Id. Specifically, these disputes were: 365 (Brazil, US); 338 (US,
Canada); 311 (Canada, US); 280 (Mexico, US); 257 (Canada, US); 222 (Brazil,
Canada); 218 (Brazil, US); 167 (Canada, US); 112 (Brazil, Peru); 97 (Chile,
US).
189 Id. Specifically, these disputes were: 365 (Brazil, US); 338 (US,
Canada); 311 (Canada, US); 280 (Mexico, US); 257 (Canada, US); 222 (Brazil,
Canada); 218 (Brazil, US); 167 (Canada, US); 112 (Brazil, Peru); 97 (Chile,
US).
19o Id. Specifically, these disputes were: 338 (US, Canada); 336 (Korea,
Japan); 311 (Canada, US); 296 (Korea, US); 280 (Mexico, US); 257 (Canada,
US); 167 (Canada, US); 97 (Chile, US).
191 Id. Specifically, this dispute was: 167 (Canada, US).
192 Id. Specifically, this dispute was: 336 (Korea, Japan).
193 Id.
194 Id. Specifically, these disputes were: 366 (Panama, Colombia); 298
(Guatemala, Mexico); 210 (US, Belgium); 67 (US, UK).
195 Id. Specifically, this dispute was: 371 (Philippines, Thailand).
196 Id.
197 Id.
198 Id. Specifically, this dispute was: 366 (Panama, Colombia).
199 Id.
200 Id.
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APEC members have brought two complaints involving the
distribution, sale, or transportation of products; 201 while members of the
IADB 212 and OAS




Members of the OAS 20° and IADB216 have brought a limited number of
complaints regarding export measures. 20 7 Members of the IADB20 ' and
OAS209 have each brought one complaint regarding governmental
disputes. 210 There have been no direct member-on-member complaints
in the WTO dispute settlement system regarding general systems of
preferences.
211
Members of APEC 212 and the OAS2 13 have brought more than ten
complaints involving import measures. In decreasing order, members
of the ADB 214 and LAIA 215 have brought more than one complaint
regarding imports.2 6 Members of ASEAN,217 CACM,21 8 the EIB,2' 9
201 See supra note 175.
202 Id. Specifically, this dispute was: 45 (US, Japan).
203 Id. Specifically, this dispute was: 292 (Canada, EC).
204 Id.
205 See supra note 175. Specifically, these disputes were: 71 (Brazil,
Canada); 46 (Canada, Brazil).
206 Id. Specifically, this dispute was: 71 (Brazil, Canada).
207 id.
208 See supra note 175. Specifically, this dispute was: 310 (Canada, US).
209 Id. Specifically, this dispute was: 310 (Canada, US).
210 See infra notes 219 - 20.
211 See supra note 175.
212 Id. Specifically, these disputes were: 367 (NZ, Australia); 342
(Canada, China); 340 (US, China); 323 (Korea, Japan); 276 (US. Canada); 275
(US, Venezuela); 271 (Philippines, Australia); 270 (Philippines, Australia); 245
(US, Japan); 232 (Chile, Mexico); 169 (Australia, Korea); 161 (US, Korea);
144 (Canada, US); 103 (US, Canada); 61 (Philippines, US); 58 (India,
Malaysia, Pakistan, Thailand v. China); 57 (US, Australia); 21 (US, Australia);
3 (IS, Korea); 1 (Singapore, Malaysia).
213 Id. Specifically, these disputes were: 348 (Panama, Colombia); 333
(Costa Rica, DR); 302 (Honduras, DR); 300 (Honduras, DR); 284 (Nicaragua,
Mexico); 276 (US, Canada); 275 (US, Venezuela); 232 (Chile, Mexico); 201
(Honduras, Nicaragua); 188 (Colombia, Nicaragua); 144 (Canada, US); 103
(US, Canada); 24 (Costa Rica, US).
214 Id. Specifically, these disputes were: 367 (NZ, Australia); 323
(Korea, Japan); 271 (Philippines, Australia); 270 (Philippines, Australia); 169
(Australia, Korea); 91 (Australia, India); 1 (Singapore, Malaysia).
215 Id. Specifically, these disputes were: 348 (Panama, Colombia); 284
(Nicaragua, Mexico); 232 (Chile, Mexico); 188 (Colombia, Nicaragua).
216 Id.
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BCIE,22 °  and the IADB 22' have brought one import-related
complaint.
222
In descending order, members of the IADB, 3 OAS 2 24 and
APEC225 have brought complaints regarding intellectual property.
2 26
APEC members have brought one complaint regarding inspection-
related issues.22 7 APEC members have brought two complaints
regarding procurement issues.
228
Members of the IADB, 229 OAS 23 0 and LAIA 23 1 have brought ten
or more complaints in regards to safeguards,23 2 followed in descending
order by APEC,
233 the EIB,
23 4 and MERCOSUR members.
2 35
217 See supra note 175. Specifically, this dispute was: 1 (Singapore,
Malaysia).
218 Id. Specifically, this dispute was: 201 (Honduras, Nicaragua).
219 Id. Specifically, this dispute was: 240 (Hungary, Romania).
220 Id. Specifically, this dispute was: 201 (Honduras, Nicaragua).
221 See supra note 175. Specifically, these disputes were: 284
(Nicaragua, Mexico); 276 (US, Canada); 275 (US, Venezuela); 245 (US,
Japan); 232 (Chile, Mexico); 201 (Honduras, Nicaragua); 188 (Colombia,
Nicaragua); 144 (Canada, US); 103 (US, Canada); 56 (US, Argentina); 24
(Costa Rica, US).
222 Id.
223 See supra note 175. Specifically, these disputes were: 224 (Brazil,
US); 199 (US, Brazil); 196 (US, Argentina); 171 (US, Argentina); 170 (US,
Canada); 86 (US, Sweden); 83 (US, Denmark); 37 (US, Portugal).
224 Id. Specifically, these disputes were: 224 (Brazil, US); 199 (US,
Brazil); 196 (US, Argentina); 171 (US Argentina); 170 (US, Canada).
225 Id. Specifically, these disputes were: 362 (US, China); 170 (US,
Canada).
226 Id.
227 See supra note 175. Specifically, this dispute was: 41 (US, Korea).
228 Id. Specifically, these disputes were: 163 (US, Korea); 95 (Japan,
US).
229 Id. Specifically, these disputes were: 356 (Argentina, Chile); 351
(Argentina, Chile); 303 (Chile, Ecuador); 278 (Argentina, Chile); 259 (Brazil,
US); 254 (Norway, US); 249 (Japan, US); 238 (Chile, Argentina); 230
(Colombia, Chile); 228 (Colombia, Chile); 226 (Argentina, Chile); 207
(Argentina, Chile); 190 (Brazil, Argentina); 78 (Colombia, US).
230 Id. Specifically, these disputes were: 356 (Argentina, Chile); 351
(Argentina, Chile); 303 (Chile, Ecuador); 278 (Argentina, Chile); 259 (Brazil,
US); 238 Chile, Argentina); 230 (Colombia, Chile); 228 (Colombia, Chile);
226 (Argentina, Chile); 207 (Argentina, Chile); 190 (Brazil, Argentina); 78
(Colombia, US).
231 Id. Specifically, these disputes were: 356 (Argentina, Chile); 351
(Argentina, Chile); 303 (Chile, Ecuador); 278 (Argentina, Chile); 238 (Chile,
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APEC23 6 and IADB 2 37 members have brought ten or more
complaints regarding specific products.238 OAS members have brought
six such complaints239 and ADB members have brought two such
240complaints.
Members of the IADB 24' and OAS 242 have brought two
complaints regarding standards.243 APEC members have brought four
complaints against other members of that organization regarding
subsidies,244 while members of the IADB2 45 and OAS have each
brought three such complaints.2 4 6
Argentina); 230 (Colombia, Chile); 228 (Colombia, Chile); 226 (Argentina,
Chile); 207 (Argentina, Chile); 190 (Brazil, Argentina).
232 Id.
233 See supra note 175. Specifically, these disputes were: 274 (Taiwan,
US); 258 (NZ, US); 252 (China, US); 251 (Korea, US); 249 (Japan, US); 202
(Korea, US); 178 (Australia, US); 177 (NZ, US).
234 Id. Specifically, this dispute was: 235 (Poland, Slovakia).
235 Id. Specifically, this dispute was: 190 (Brazil, Argentina).
236 Id. Specifically, these disputes were: 343 (Thailand, US); 236
(Canada, US); 204 (US, Mexico); 195 (US, Philippines); 139 (Japan, Canada);
102 (US, Philippines); 76 (US, Japan); 74 (US, Philippines); 64 (Japan,
Indonesia); 59 (US, Indonesia); 55 (Japan, Indonesia); 44 (US, Japan); 28 (US,
Japan); 20 (Canada, Korea); 5 (US, Korea).
237 Id. Specifically, these disputes were: 236 (Canada, US); 204 (US,
Mexico); 173 (US, France); 80 (US, Belgium); 76 (US, Japan); 65 (US, Brazil);
52 (US, Brazil); 51 (Japan, Brazil); 31 (US, Canada); 28 (US, Japan).
238 Id.
239 See supra note 175. Specifically, these disputes were: 285 (Antigua,
US); 236 (Canada, US); 204 (US, Mexico); 65 (US, Brazil); 52 (US Brazil); 31
(US, Canada).
240 Id. Specifically, these disputes were: 64 (Japan, Indonesia); 55
(Japan, Indonesia).
241 Id. Specifically, these disputes were: 4 (Brazil, US); 2 (Venezuela,
US).
242 Id. Specifically, these disputes were: 4 (Brazil, US); 2 (Venezuela,
US).
243 Id.
244 See supra note 175. Specifically, these disputes were: 357 (Canada,
US); 194 (Canada, US); 126 (US, Australia); 106 (US, Australia).
245 Id. Specifically, these disputes were: 357 (Canada, US); 267 (Brazil,
US); 194 (Canada, US).
246 Id. Specifically, these disputes were: 357 (Canada, US); 267 (Brazil,
US); 194 (Canada, US).
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Members of the IADB 247 and APEC2 4 8 have brought ten or more
complaints against other members within the same organization
regarding tariff measures.2 49 OAS members have brought tariff-based
complaints eight times, 2 50 followed, in decreasing order of frequency,
by members of LAIA2 5' and the EIB 2
C. RESULT TRENDS
Many possible outcomes exist once a WTO member files a
complaint with the WTO dispute settlement body. For the purposes of
this article, these outcomes have been broken down into the following
categories: appeal pending, mixed outcomes (meaning that both the
complainant state and the respondent state have had positive rulings
from the Panel), mutually agreed settlements, Panel decision against
complainant state, Panel decision against Respondent state, Panel
established but no further action, and settled or inactive.
Both APEC 253 and IADB2 54 members have ended complaints
against other member states through mutually agreed settlements in
247 Id. Specifically, these disputes were: 329 (Mexico, Panama); 308
(US, Mexico); 261 (Chile, Uruguay); 255 (Chile, Peru); 251 (Korea, US); 227
(Chile, EC); 131 (US, France); 128 (US, Netherlands); 127 (US, Belgium); I l l
(Argentina, US); 109 (US, Chile); 11 (US, Japan); 10 (Canada, Japan); 6
(Japan, US).
248 Id. Specifically, these disputes were: 359 (Mexico, China); 358 (US,
China); 308 (US, Mexico); 255 (Chile, Peru); 227 (Chile, EC); 109 (US, Chile);
84 (US, Korea); 11 (US, Japan); 10 (Canada, Japan); 6 (Japan, US).
249 Id.
250 See supra note 175. Specifically, these disputes were: 329 (Mexico,
Panama); 308 (US, Mexico); 261 (Chile, Uruguay); 255 (Chile, Peru); 251
(Korea, US); 227 (Chile, EC); 111 (Argentina, US); 109 (US, Chile).
251 Id. Specifically, these disputes were: 261 (Chile, Uruguay); 255
(Chile, Peru); 227 (Chile, EC).
252 Id. Specifically, this dispute was: 289 (Poland, Czech).
253 See generally supra note 146. Specifically, these disputes were: 323
(Korea, Japan); 311 (Canada, US); 281 (Mexico, US); 277 (Canada, US); 264
(Canada, US); 247 (Canada, US); 245 (US, Japan); 236 (Canada, US); 126
(US, Australia); 103 (US, Canada); 102 (US, Philippines); 74 (US,
Philippines); 28 (US, Japan); 21 (US Australia); 20 (Canada, Korea); 6 (Japan,
US); 5 (US, Korea).
254 Id. Specifically, these disputes were: 348 (Panama, Colombia); 329
(Mexico, Panama); 31 l(Canada, US); 309 (US, China); 281 (Mexico, US); 264
(Canada, US); 261 (Chile, Uruguay); 257 (Canada, US); 250 (Brazil, US); 247
(Canada, US); 245 (US, Japan); 236 (Canada, US); 210 (US, Belgium); 199
(US, Brazil); 196 (US, Argentina); 190 (Brazil, Argentina); 171 (US,
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excess of fifteen times. 255  Members of the OAS,25 6 LAIA, 25 7 the
ADB,258 MERCOSUR 259 and EIB 260 have also ended complaints
against other member states through mutually agreed settlement.
Members of the IADB,2 6 ' APEC262 and OAS 2 63 have had
complaints end in Panel decisions against the complainant. 264 Panel
decisions against the respondent have most frequently occurred in
complaints involving members of the IADB,
265 OAS 266 and APEC ,267
Argentina); 103 (US, Canada); 86 (US, Sweden); 83 (US, Denmark); 37 (US,
Portugal); 28 (US, Japan); 6 (Japan, US).
255 Id.
256 See generally supra note 146. Specifically, these disputes were: 348
(Panama, Colombia); 329 (Mexico, Panama); 311 (Canada, US); 281 (Mexico,
US); 277 (Canada, US); 264 (Canada, US); 261 (Chile, Uruguay); 257
(Canada, US); 250 (Brazil, US); 247 (Canada, US); 236 (Canada, US); 199
(US, Brazil); 196 (US, Argentina); 190 (Brazil, Argentina); 171 (US,
Argentina); 103 (US, Canada).
257 Id. Specifically, these disputes were: 261 (Chile, Uruguay); 190
(Brazil, Argentina).
258 Id. Specifically, these disputes were: 323 (Korea, Japan); 93 (NZ,
India); 91 (Australia, India).
259 Id. Specifically, this dispute was: 190 (Brazil, Argentina).
260 Id. Specifically, this dispute was: 235 (Poland, Slovakia).
261 Id. Specifically, these disputes were: 296 (Korea, US); 282 (Mexico,
US); 244 (Japan, US); 204 (US, Mexico); 194 (Canada, US); 163 (US, Korea);
44 (US, Japan).
262 See supra note 146. Specifically, these disputes were: 282 (Mexico,
US); 244 (Japan, US); 204 (US, Mexico); 194 (Canada, US); 44 (US, Japan).
263 Id. Specifically, these disputes were: 282 (Mexico, US); 204 (US,
Mexico); 194 (Canada, US).
264 Id.
265 See generally supra note 146. Specifically, these disputes were: 335
(Ecuador, US); 331 (Guatemala, Mexico); 322 (Japan, US); 308 (US, Mexico);
295 (US, Mexico); 170 (US, Canada); 156 (Mexico, Guatemala); 70 (Brazil,
Canada); 56 (US, Argentina); 24 (Costa Rica, US); 11 (US, Japan); 10 (Canada,
Japan); 4 (Brazil, US); 2 (Venezuela, US).
266 Id. Specifically, these disputes were: 335 (Ecuador, US); 331
(Guatemala, Mexico); 308 (US, Mexico); 302 (Honduras, DR); 295 (US,
Mexico); 285 (Antigua, US); 170 (US, Canada); 162 (Japan, US); 156 (Mexico,
Guatemala); 70 (Brazil, Canada); 56 (US, Argentina); 24 (Costa Rica, US); 4
(Brazil US); 2 (Venezuela, US).
267 Id. Specifically, these disputes were: 322 (Japan, US); 308 (US,
Mexico); 295 (US, Mexico); 170 (US, Canada); 169 (Australia, Korea); 162
(Japan, US); 99 (Korea, US); 84 (US, Korea); 76 (US, Japan); 58 (India,
Malaysia, Thailand v. US); 11 (US, Japan); 10 (Canada, Japan).
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while such decisions have occurred once for members of the ADB.26 s
Mixed Panel and/or appellate decisions have also most frequently
occurred in complaints brought by members of the IADB, 269 OAS27 °
and APEC,2 7 1 as well as for members of LAIA,27 2 the ADB, 273 and
MERCOSUR. 27 4 There is currently one complaint in which an appeal is
pending. This case involves members of the ADB, APEC and the
IADB.
275
Panels have been requested by the IADB 276 and OAS most
frequently,277 followed by APEC, 2 7s LAIA,2 79 ADB, 280 ASEAN 281' and
268 Id. Specifically, this dispute was: 169 (Australia, Korea).
269 Id. Specifically, these disputes were: 268 (Argentina, US);267
(Brazil, US); 259 (Brazil, US); 253 (Switzerland, US); 249 (Japan, US); 241
(Brazil, Argentina); 238 (Chile, Argentina); 234 (Canada & Mexico v. US);
222 (Brazil, Canada); 217 (Australia, Brazil, Chile, EC, India, Indonesia, Japan,
Korea, Thailand v. US); 207 (Argentina, Chile); 184 (Japan, US); 132 (US,
Mexico); 31 (US, Canada).
270 Id. Specifically, these disputes were: 268 (Argentina, US); 267
(Brazil, US); 259 (Brazil, US); 241 (Brazil, Argentina); 238 (Chile, Argentina);
234 (Canada & Mexico v. US); 222 (Brazil, Canada); 207 (Argentina, Chile);
132 (US, Mexico); 46 (Canada, Brazil); 31 (US, Canada).
271 See generally supra note 146. Specifically, these disputes were: 313
(India, EC); 258 (NZ, US); 252 (China, US); 251 (Korea, US); 249 (Japan,
US); 234 (Canada & Mexico v. US); 217 (Australia, Brazil, Chile, EC, India,
Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Thailand v. US); 202 (Korea, US); 184 (Japan, US);
179 (Korea, US); 178 (Australia, US); 177 (NZ, US); 161 (US, Korea); 139
(Japan, Canada); 132 (US, Mexico); 64 (Japan, Indonesia); 59 (US, Indonesia);
55 (Japan, Indonesia).
72 Id. Specifically, these disputes were: 241 (Brazil, Argentina); 238
(Chile, Argentina); 207 (Argentina, Chile).
273 Id. Specifically, these disputes were: 313 (India, EC); 64 (Japan,
Indonesia); 55 (Japan, Indonesia).
274 Id. Specifically, this dispute was: 241 (Brazil, Argentina).
275 Id. Specifically, this dispute was: 336 (Korea, Japan).
276 Id. Specifically, these disputes were: 346 (Argentina, US); 338 (US,
Canada); 325 (Mexico, US); 310 (Canada, US); 303 (Chile, Ecuador); 278
(Argentina, Chile); 275 (US, Venezuela); 272 (Argentina, Peru); 239 (Brazil,
US); 230 (Colombia, Chile); 226 (Argentina, Chile); 224 (Brazil, US); 220
(Guatemala, Chile); 218 (Brazil, US); 216 (Brazil, Mexico); 203 (US, Mexico);
201 (Honduras, Nicaragua); 197 (US, Brazil); 187 (CR, Trinidad); 182
(Mexico, Ecuador); 180 (Canada, US); 173 (US, France); 167 (Canada, US);
144 (Canada, US); 131 (US, France); 128 (US, Netherlands); 127 (US,
Belgium); 112 (Brazil, Peru); I ll (Argentina, US); 109 (US, Chile); 97 (Chile,
US); 80 (US, Belgium); 78 (Colombia, US); 71 (Brazil, Canada); 65 (US,
Brazil); 52 (US, Brazil); 51 (Japan, Brazil); 45 (US, Japan).
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the E1B. 282 Panels have been established by APEC, 283 OAS,284 the
285 286 28 M2C11RIADB, 'LAIA, ADB, " and MERCOSUR.288
277 See generally supra note 146. Specifically, these disputes were: 346
(Argentina, US); 338 (US, Canada); 325 (Mexico, US); 310 (Canada, US); 303
(Chile, Ecuador); 278 (Argentina, Chile); 275 (US, Venezuela); 272
(Argentina, Peru); 239 (Brazil, US); 230 (Colombia, Chile); 226 (Argentina,
Chile); 224 (Brazil, US); 220 (Guatemala, Chile); 218 (Brazil, US); 216
(Brazil, Mexico); 203 (US, Mexico); 201 (Honduras, Nicaragua); 197 (US,
Brazil); 187 (CR, Trinidad); 182 (Mexico, Ecuador); 180 (Canada, US); 167
(Canada, US); 144 (Canada, US); 112 (Brazil, Peru); Ill (Argentina, US); 109
(US, Chile); 97 (Chile, US); 78 (Colombia, US); 71 (Brazil, Canada); 65 (US,
Brazil); 52 (US, Brazil).
278 Id. Specifically, these disputes were: 368 (China, US); 338 (US,
Canada); 325 (Mexico, US); 324 (Thailand, US); 274 (Taiwan, US); 271
(Philippines, Australia); 215 (Korea, Philippines); 203 (US, Mexico); 180
(Canada, US); 167 (Canada, US); 144 (Canada, US); 109 (US, Chile); 97
(Chile, US); 61 (Philippines, US); 45 (US, Japan); 41 (US, Korea); 3 (US,
Korea).
279 Id. Specifically, these disputes were: 303 (Chile, Ecuador); 278
(Argentina, Chile); 272 (Argentina, Peru); 230 (Colombia Chile); 226
(Argentina, Chile); 216 (Brazil, Mexico); 182 (Mexico, Ecuador); 112 (Brazil,
Peru).
280 Id. Specifically, these cases were: 371 (Philippines, Thailand); 318
(Taiwan, India); 271 (Philippines, Australia); 215 (Korea, Philippines).
281 Id. Specifically, this dispute was: 371 (Philippines, Thailand).
282 Id. Specifically, this dispute was: 289 (Poland, Czech).
283 See generally supra note 146. Specifically, these disputes were: 367
(NZ, Australia); 363 (US, China); 362 (US, China); 359 (Mexico, China); 357
(Canada, US); 344 (Mexico, US); 343 (Thailand, US); 342 (Canada, China);
340 (US, China); 280 (Mexico, US); 270 (Philippines. Australia); 195 (US,
Philippines).
284 Id. Specifically, these disputes were: 366 (Panama, Colombia); 365
(Brazil, US); 357 (Canada, US); 356 (Argentina, Chile); 355 (Argentina,
Brazil); 351 (Argentina, Chile); 344 (Mexico, US); 280 (Mexico, US); 188
(Colombia, Nicaragua); 164 (US, Argentina).
285 Id. Specifically, these disputes were: 366 (Panama, Colombia); 365
(Brazil, US); 357 (Canada, US); 356 (Argentina, Chile); 355 (Argentina,
Brazil); 351 (Argentina, Chile); 344 (Mexico, US); 280 (Mexico, US); 188
(Colombia, Nicaragua); 164 (US, Argentina).
286 Id. Specifically, these disputes were: 366 (Panama, Colombia); 356
(Argentina, Chile); 355 (Argentina, Brazil); 351 (Argentina, Chile); 188
(Colombia, Nicaragua).
287 Id. Specifically, these disputes were: 367 (NZ, Australia); 270
(Philippines, Australia).
288 Id. Specifically, this dispute was: 355 (Argentina, Brazil).
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In descending order, the members of the following organizations
have initiated complaints that are currently listed as Settled or Inactive
by the WTO: APEC,28 9 IADB,2 90 OAS,2 91 LAIA,2 92 ASEAN,293
ADB, 294 and the EIB.295
V. ANALYSIS OF CORRELATIONS AND LAW OF REGIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS
What can be learned about WTO dispute settlement from the
above study concerning the interaction between members of various
regional economic organizations and regional organizations at the
WTO dispute settlement level? There are several important lessons
that can be taken from the information presented in this study. These
lessons are important not only in that they shed light on past and
current behavior of WTO member states vis-a-vis the WTO dispute
settlement process but also because they are predictors of future
behavior. This is true because, even though not all members of the
regional organizations discussed are current members of the WTO,
most of these non-WTO members are in the process of becoming WTO
members in the near future.
The quintessential finding of this article is that, when there are a
large number of members in a regional organization and the regional
organization does not have a firmly established dispute settlement
system for economic disputes, members are more likely to bring
289 See generally supra note 146. Specifically, these disputes were: 358
(US, China); 255 (Chile, Peru); 232 (Chile, Mexico); 227 (Chile, Peru); 106
(US, Australia); 101 (US, Mexico); 95 (Japan, US); 89 (Korea, US); 57 (US,
Australia); 49 (Mexico, US); I (Singapore, Malaysia).
290 Id. Specifically, these disputes were: 298 (Guatemala, Mexico); 284
(Nicaragua, Mexico); 255 (Chile, Peru); 232 (Chile, Mexico); 228 (Colombia,
Chile); 227 (Chile, Peru); 101 (US, Mexico); 95 (Japan, US); 49 (Mexico, US;
23 (Mexico, Venezuela).
291 Id. Specifically, these disputes were: 298 (Guatemala, Mexico); 284
(Nicaragua, Mexico); 255 (Chile, Peru); 232 (Chile, Mexico); 228 (Colombia,
Chile); 227 (Chile, Peru); 101 (US, Mexico); 49 (Mexico, US); 23 (Mexico,
Venezuela).
292 Id. Specifically, these disputes were: 284 (Nicaragua, Mexico); 255
(Chile, Peru); 232 (Chile, Mexico); 228 (Colombia, Chile); 227 (Chile, Peru).
293 Id. Specifically, this dispute was: I (Singapore, Malaysia).
294 Id. Specifically, these disputes were: 306 (Bangladesh, India); 1
(Singapore, Malaysia).
295 See generally supra note 146. Specifically, this dispute was: 240
(Hungary, Romania).
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economic and trade-related grievances with other member states to the
WTO. Examples of this finding can be found in the frequency with
which members of the OAS, APEC, and LAIA have brought
complaints against other member states. It is interesting to note that the
aims of the regional organization per se are not a relevant predictor of
whether members of a regional organization will bring complaints
against each other at the WTO level. Instead, it appears the communal
understandings and traditions of regional organizations and the
availability of alternate dispute resolution at the regional level is a
better predictor of member state behavior at the WTO. This is
particularly evident in examples such as ASEAN, where members
share an articulated commonality of cultural and legal beliefs, which
are expressed in legal agreements involving trade and in the creation of
dispute settlement bodies.
The impact of shared membership in a regional banking entity is
another key finding of this article. Because of the legal structure of the
regional banks addressed in this article, it appears that there is no
perceived penalty or negative side to bringing other members of
regional banking organizations before the WTO. The fact that the
regional banking organizations studied provide a uniform membership
and decision-making structure means that members do not have to
worry about the potential for punitive or retaliatory measures in the
event that they do bring complaints to the WTO. The same can be said
for the governing structures of these regional banking organizations in
that their essentially democratic methods of membership representation
and governance make the potential for retaliation or punishment very
low. Additionally, the WTO is the logical place for members of
regional banking organizations to take their economic or trade-related
complaints because the laws of these banking organizations do not
provide a forum for settling disputes other than those directly between
the banking organization and a member state.
Once at the WTO, complaints against members of regional
economic organizations or regional organizations tend to cluster around
areas such as anti-dumping and safeguards, which are of vital
importance to the trading regime of the complainant and are not
provided for in the constitutive legal regimes of many of the
organizations studied. The exception to this rule tends to be for the
three largest complainants, members of the OAS, APEC and the IADB.
In terms of complaint results, the majority of complaints that
have seen a completed panel decision which was accepted by the
parties involved in the dispute have been filed by members of the
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IADB, APEC, and the OAS. Members of other organizations
traditionally settled their disputes through Mutually Agreed Settlement
or by abandoning the complaint. In addition, some of those
organizations requested a Panel, but would not follow through on the
formal proceedings beyond that point. The vast majority of currently
established panels are for complaints brought by members of the IADB,
OAS, and APEC.
In sum, the information and conclusions presented in this article
highlight the many facets of legal and political decision-making
required for any state to utilize the WTO's dispute settlement body as a
mechanism to redress allegations of wrongdoing in the economic and
trade spheres. At a time when regional organizations are increasing in
visibility and function, it is vital that the impact of such organizations
on WTO disputes be understood in order to understand the value of the
WTO dispute settlement system in a regionalized world. This is
particularly vital as free trade agreements are becoming a more popular
tool among states and the membership in the WTO is expanding to
include most members of the regional organizations discussed in this
paper.
VI. CONCLUSION
This article presents the legal framework in which the WTO
dispute settlement body was formed and currently operates. It also
presents the legal and economic structures of regional economic
organizations and regional organizations that have members that have
brought complaints against each other at the WTO dispute settlement
level. Against these background frameworks, this article then analyzes
the behavior of members of the regional economic organizations and
regional organizations at the WTO dispute settlement level. The key
discoveries made in this article are the correlation between the
structures and membership communalities found in a regional
organization and the likelihood that one of its members will bring a
complaint regarding another member to the WTO dispute settlement
body. This article has also found that the chance for retaliatory or
punitive measures - or lack thereof- is an important factor in
analyzing the behavior of regional organization members at the WTO
dispute settlement body. Further, this article finds that, once at the
WTO, there is a strong correlation between the structure of a regional
or regional economic organization, the types of complaints which its
members will bring against each other at the WTO dispute level, and
the outcomes of these disputes. Thus, this article finds that legal and
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political peer pressure - in the form of membership in a regional
economic organization or regional organization generally - is only as
effective at stopping WTO disputes as the legal framework of the
organization is at providing its members with a sense of communality
and an alternate forum for the airing of their economic and trade-related
grievances.

